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Abstract
Under the existing marriage contracts, the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of
the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the standard long-term marriage contracts, by exploring the
conditions  under  which  short-term contracts  would  be  more  desirable.  Using  a  two-period  collective
household  model,  we  show  that,  under  general  conditions  on  individual  preferences  and  household
production technology, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts.
Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term
contracts even more desirable than in the past. 
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Introduction
In 2008, about 2,162,000 marriages were celebrated in the U.S. At the same time, the number of divorces
amounted to 1,099,080.1 Moreover, as shown by Figure 1, while the marriage rate remained quite constant
during the 20th century, the divorce rate was multiplied by 5 over that period. 
Figure  1: U.S. Marriage and Divorce Rate per 1,000 Population
  Sources: National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. 
In the light of the high divorce rate, and of the non-negligible costs of divorce, we may wonder whether
the traditional marriage contract is still appropriate. The existing marriage contract takes, as the default
length, the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. It may make sense to propose marriage contracts with a
shorter default  length,  that  is,  a short-term marriage contract,  which would allow spouses to exit  the
marriage without costs.
This paper explores the conditions under which short-term marriage contracts, if available, would be more
desirable  than  standard  long-term  contracts.  Quite  surprisingly,  short-term  marriage  contracts  have
received little interest so far.2
In pioneer unpublished writings (1773 and 1797), Jeremy Bentham discussed the opportunity to introduce
1 The source is the National Center for Health Statistics (2010).
2 In 2009, the Australian Bureau of Statistics floated the idea of marriage licenses that expire after 5 or 10 years, unless couples renew it (see [6]).
But one can find traces of such practices in the Muslim culture (the Nikah Mut’ah in the Shi’a Islam) and also in the Pre-Islamic Arab culture (the
Nika’e’Misyar in Sunni Islam).
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short-term marriage contracts (see [11]). Bentham regarded these short contracts as appealing alternatives
to long contracts at a time when divorce was not easily available, and as appropriate marriage contracts for
the young, who would otherwise not be able to enter lifelong relationships. Bentham acknowledged that
standard long-term contracts are compatible with the Principle of Utility for some couples, but wanted to
add short-term contracts as these would better fit some others.
Recently, the marriage contract has attracted a large attention, but, as far as we know, little has been said
on the optimal contract duration. Some issues have been addressed, such as informational constraints on
outside opportunities ([10]), prenuptial contracting behavior ([7]), the actual duration of marriages ([9])
and the interval  between relationships ([5]).3 Moreover,  despite the considerable attention paid to the
duration  of  agreements  and  contracts,  the  literature  has  not  so  far  applied  optimal  duration  contract
analysis to the marriage contract.4
To examine the conditions under which short-term marriage contracts are optimal,  various theoretical
frameworks could be used, allowing for more or less complexity in terms of preferences, knowledge and
household  production.  In  this  paper,  we  deliberately  opt  for  the  simplest  framework,  to  provide  a
benchmark discussion on the duration of marriage contracts.
For that purpose, we consider a two-period collective household model where agents differ in gender and
in marital status (single, married, divorced). Agents produce and consume a single good. The good can be
interpreted  in  various  ways.  For  instance,  one  can  think  of  standard  consumption  goods  or  leisure
activities. Alternatively, one can regard a child as a consumption good that is collectively produced by his
parents.
Individuals make decisions on marital status at the beginning of every period. The decision on marital
status depends on the costs of divorce and marriage, on the productivity gains induced by marriage, and on
the bargaining power of each agent within the couple.
For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that there is perfect information and no uncertainty. Those
assumptions are not  neutral  for  the issue at  stake,  but  will  allow us  to  emphasize some fundamental
motives supporting one marriage contract against another in that simple environment. Clearly, it is easy to
think about uncertainty-based arguments for or against one type of marriage contract.5 In this paper, we
abstract from those arguments, to better emphasize how the characteristics of the household production
technology and of individual and couple’s preferences influence the desirability of one marriage contract
over the other.
We show that, under general conditions on individual preferences and household production technology,
short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. It is only in the special
case of time-invariant or time-increasing household productivity, that the long-term contract dominates the
short-term contract. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown
3 Various aspects of marriage are also discussed in [4].
4 The optimal contract duration has been studied in other economic fields (see [8], [3], [2], [1]).
5 One can think, for instance, of the insurance motive for long-term marriage, which is related to the insurance provided by the spouse’s
income. There exists also an uncertainty argument for short-term contracts, which could be regarded as less risky in a world of imperfect
information about the spouse’s characteristics.
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to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework. Short-term and long-term marriage
contracts are compared in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We consider a two-period model, with two types of agents, males and females, denoted by the superscripts
m  and f . We assume an equal number of men and women.
We consider two kinds of marriage contracts, which differ in their duration. On the one hand, agents may
choose a long contract, which lasts for the rest of the life of the spouses (i.e. the two life-periods), except
if there is a divorce. On the other hand, agents may choose a short marriage contract, which lasts for only
one period, after which agents become singles again, at no cost. Hence the main difference between the
two contracts concerns the exit cost and the continuation cost.
At the beginning of the first period, all agents are single (S). They receive a random marriage offer from
an agent of different  gender.  The marriage offer  only includes the consumptions in the two periods. 6
Agents decide either to remain single (S), or to get married, under either the short-term (MS) or the long-
term  marriage  contract  (ML).  At  the  beginning  of  the  second  period,  agents  have  diverse  options,
depending on their marital status chosen at period 1. If they are single (S), they can choose either to
remain single (S), or to get married (MS or ML). If they are married under the long-term contract (ML),
they can choose to divorce (D) or to remain married (ML).  If  they are married under the short-term
contract (MS), they can choose to become single (S) or to marry again (ML or MS).7 Figure 4 in the
Appendix is a graphical representation of all possible decision nodes under the two types of marriage
contract.
Agents have a period utility function that is logarithmic in consumption. Lifetime welfare takes a standard
time-additive form, with a pure discount factor denoted by  . The household values the weighted sum of
spouses utilities, with weights representing the bargaining power of each spouse, respectively 
m  for men
and 
f  for women. We assume that 0j  and 1=fm   .
On the production side, all agents inelastically work for the entire period of time, and have an individual
productivity parameter denoted by  I . There is no differences in individual productivity of agents, and
they all produce the same good. The model allows for a large set of interpretations, depending on what the
unique good consists of. One can think of it as a standard consumption good (consumed individually but
produced either individually or in couples), or as a leisure activity.8 Married agents cooperatively combine
individual productivities to produce a total amount of good equal to I2 , where 0>  is the efficiency
6 Note that the present model is extremely simplified regarding the matching process. As such, this eliminates a potential determinant of the
desirability of short-term contracts.
7 This includes the possibility to renew the marriage contract with the same person, or to get married with another person.
8 One can also consider the good as a child. That interpretation imposes some restrictions on the production parameters    and    that are
discussed below.
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gain (if 1> ) or loss (if 1< ) from marriage.9 Note that the gains or losses from marriage may not be
constant over time. To take this into account, we assume that the household productivity in the second
period of marriage differs from the productivity in the first period of marriage by a factor  . If 1> , the
household becomes more productive as the duration of the marriage increases. That productivity gain may
arise  thanks  to  some  “learning-by-doing”  within  the  couple,  or  thanks  to  a  better  understanding  or
knowledge of the spouse. Alternatively, if 1< , the household becomes less productive over time. This
may be due to the accumulation of disappointments or disagreements.
On the consumption side, unmarried agents entirely consume the product of their labor. When married, it
follows from the household value function that each spouse consumes a fraction  
j  of the household
product I2 .
When deciding to get married or divorced, each agent compares her welfare in the two states. Then, the
choice of the marriage contract (i.e. short or long) is driven by the preferences of the couple-member with
the lowest bargaining power, i.e. by the },{min fmj   .10 The decision of getting divorced depends
on the legal regime of divorce. If consensual, the willing of the agent with },{max= fmj   will drive
the decision. If unilateral, the willing of the agent with },{min= fmj   will drive the decision.
The cost of getting married is a fraction   of the household’s income, with  0,1 . The cost of getting
divorced (e.g.  legal  fees,  alimony transfers  etc.)  is  a  fraction   ,  with  0,1)( ,  of  the household’s
income.
The problem faced by a single agent at the beginning of 1=t  depends on the kind of marriage contract
available. We describe the agent’s optimization problem under three cases: (1) only long-term contracts
are available; (2) only short-term contracts are available; (3) both contracts are available. For each case,
we also provide the solution to the optimization problem.
 
1.  Long-term contract: Single agents who get married solve the following problem:
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The policy function mfj ,= is given by: 
             IIII jjj   1log21log,2log21logmax
9 One can interpret the parameter    as accounting for household economies of scale;  1>  then coincides with increasing returns in the
production of the good.
10 In other words, the weakest agent in the couple has a veto right regarding both the marriage decision and the contract decision.
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2.  Short-term contract: Single agents who get married solve the following problem:
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The policy function mfj ,= is
          IIII jjj log)(12log,)(12log)(12logmax  
3.  All contracts: Single agents who remain single solve the following problem:
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The policy function mfj ,= is
           IIII j loglog,21loglogmax  
Alternatively, the agent’s choices can be described by means of the decision trees in Figures 5 and 6 in the
Appendix, which show the payoffs associated with the different possible paths.
Short-term versus long-term contracts
The model is solved by backward induction, starting from the decisions made at the terminal node, which
corresponds to the beginning of period 2. The following Proposition summarizes the optimal choices of
agent mfj ,=  for different values of the parameters. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose agents are initially singles. Then: 
(a) If 1>)2(1 j  and 1>2 j  and  1 , then the long-term contract is better than the short-
term contract.
(b) If  1>)2(1 j  and  1>2 j  and   1< ,  then the short-term contract is better than the
long-term contract. 
(c) If 1>)2(1 j  and 1<2 j , then the short-term contract is better than the long-term contract. 
(d) If 1<)2(1 j  and 1>2 j , then the long-term contract is better than the short-term contract. 
(e) If 1<)2(1 j  and 1<2 j , then there is indifference between the short-term contract and the
long-term contract, as these are both dominated by singleness. 
(f) If  1=)2(1 j  then if  1>2 j , the long-term contract is preferred. However, if  1<2 j ,
then there is indifference between the two contracts, as these are both dominated by singleness.
24
Proof. To prove this Proposition it is sufficient to compare the payoffs of different path of the decision
trees in Figures 5 and 6. 
Take the case where household productivity is constant with marriage duration (i.e. 1= ). Cases (b) and
(c)  cannot  occur,  so  that  the  long-term marriage  contract  weakly dominates  the  short-term marriage
contract. Indeed, if the gains from marriage are sufficiently large (i.e. a high  ), agents prefer the long-
term contract (to avoid the cost of remarriage). But if the gains from marriage are low, agents prefer being
single, and are thus indifferent between the two marriage contracts.
Consider  now the  case  where    differs  from 1.  If  the  household  becomes  more  productive  as  the
marriage duration increases (i.e.  1> ), cases (b) and (c) cannot hold, so that the long-term contract is
dominant.  However, if  the household becomes less productive as the marriage duration increases (i.e.
1< ),  cases (b) and (c) may arise. These correspond to different motives for choosing a short-term
marriage contract. In case (b), the productivity loss due to marriage duration is low, which makes the
married status better than singleness in the second period. If the cost of remarriage is sufficiently low with
respect to the productivity loss due to marriage duration (i.e.  1< ), agents prefer two short marriage
contracts instead of a long one. In that case, agents want to be married, and the productivity loss induced
by duration makes the short-term contract better, because it allows agents to benefit twice from the large
immediate  productivity  gains  induced  by  marriage  (in  comparison  to  singleness).  In  case  (c),  the
productivity  loss  due  to  marriage  duration,  which  is  larger  than  in  case  (b),  makes  singleness  more
desirable than being married in the second period. That second-period singleness can be achieved at no
cost under the short-term marriage contract. Hence, in this case, the short-term contract allows agents to
become single for free, unlike the costly divorce under long-term contracts.
In sum, despite the absence of any risk or unanticipated event, the short-term contract may be superior,
thanks to the possibilities either to marry again and benefit twice from the immediate productivity gains
from marriage, or to become single for free. Note that the results of Proposition 1 are invariant to the
divorce regime (unilateral or consensual). The reason is that, once short-term contracts are introduced,
there are no divorces any more. Actually, a costly exit from the standard long-term marriage is strictly
dominated by a free exit under a short-term marriage.
How does Proposition 1 translate into actual agreements? In particular, can this rationalize the history of
actual  marriage  contracts?  Proposition  2  provides  an  answer  to  those  questions  under  the  cases  of
consensual and unilateral divorces.11
Proposition 2. Table 1 and 2 summarize the contracts that are chosen by the couple when a spouse (e.g.
 ) faces one of the cases (a) to (f) of Proposition 1, and, similarly, the other spouse (e.g.  ) faces one of
the cases (a) to (f) of Proposition 1. 
11 The cases (a)-(f) refer to the conditions on parameters stated in Proposition 1. The cell is empty when those circumstances cannot arise.
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 Proof. Consider  case  (a)-(a).  In  this  case,  both  of  the  spouses  prefer  a  long-term marriage  contract.
Consider case (a)-(c). Here, the spouse with    prefers a long-term contract, while the spouse with  
prefers a short-term contract. Hence, the contract that will be chosen by the couple is a short-term contract
with remarriage in the second period. The other cases are similar. 
In the light of Proposition 2 (Table 1),  it  appears that  short-term contracts,  when available,  dominate
singleness and long-term contracts in various cases. There remain only three cases where the long-term
contract prevails. First, the case where the productivity gains induced by marriage are large and persistent
(i.e. case (a)-(a)). Second, the case where the distribution of power in the household is such that the man
would like to have a long contract, while the woman is only interested in marriage for the second period
(thanks to the returns from marriage in period 2), but is sufficiently patient (i.e. a high  ) (i.e. case (a)-
(d)). Third, the case where both the man and the woman only appreciate marriage in the second period,
and are sufficiently patient (i.e. cases (d)-(d) and (f)-(d)). In all other cases, what prevails is either short-
term marriage contracts (if high returns from marriage in both periods or in the first period when agents
are impatient) or singleness (if low returns from marriage in all periods). Those results are invariant to the
divorce regime.
Proposition 2 (Table 2) suggests that, in the absence of short-term marriage contract, all the cases where
short-term  contracts  prevail  would  now  involve  either  long-term  marriage  contracts  or  singleness,
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depending on the household production technology and the agents’ preferences.
What does Proposition 2 tell us about history? To interpret the large prevalence of long-term marriage
contracts, it is crucial to have a closer look at the motivations behind the emerging long-term contracts in
the absence of short-term contracts. In the absence of short-term contracts, agents can be married under a
long-term contract regime because of different motives: some agents are married by  impatience in the
sense that they are currently enjoying large household productivity gains and forget the future costs of
marriage, whereas other agents are married by patience, in the sense that they are currently suffering from
low returns, but hope to get more from marriage in the future. These distinct motivations have tremendous
effects on what would have prevailed in the presence of short-term contracts.  Actually,  if  agents are
married by impatience in the absence of short-term contracts, those agents would have opted for a short-
term contract if this was available. On the contrary, if agents are married by patience, the introduction of
short-term contracts would not necessarily affect the emerging marriage regime, as long-term contracts
remain the unique way to benefit from large household returns growth over time.
Regarding the role of the distribution of bargaining power within the household, it should be noticed that a
movement towards an equality of bargaining power coincides with a convergence towards the diagonal of
the tables, where both agents face the same conditions. The impact of such a shift on the prevalence of
short-term and long-term contracts can hardly be assessed without additional information on preferences
and production parameters. Nonetheless, if we follow Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient Reason, and
consider all subcases as equally likely (and assign a probability of 1/2 when there is indeterminacy within
a  particular  subcase),  we  get  that  the  short-term contract,  if  available,  would  have  prevailed  with  a
probability of 55/180. On the contrary, if we focus on the diagonal of the table only, we see that short-
term contracts would have prevailed today with a much larger probability,  equal to 1/2. Therefore the
recent  redistribution of  bargaining power  towards more  equality makes  short-term marriage  contracts
more desirable than before.
Proposition 2 can be interpreted in various ways, depending on what the consumption good is. If the good
consists of a leisure activity consumed individually or within a couple, a major determinant of the optimal
marriage contract  consists  of  the parameter   .  If  the activity involves  increasing returns from intra-
couple interactions (e.g. chess playing),   is large, which supports long-term contracts. On the contrary,
if the leisure activity involves  decreasing intra-couple returns over time,  then this supports short-term
contracts. One can also turn back to the interpretation of the good as a child. In that context, a low   and
a high   lead to interpret the first period of marriage as a kind of trial period, which supports a long-term
marriage. On the contrary, a high   and a low   support a short-term contract, as the old couple can no
longer bear the idea of having new children, unlike new couples.
Finally, consider some numerical illustrations showing how the prevalence of various marriage contracts
depends on the parameters  of  the model.  We assume  an equal  division of  bargaining power,  a  time
preference factor  0.96= , as well as a marriage cost  0.10= . Figures 2 and 3 show the prevailing
marriage agreements when the household production parameters   and   lie in the [0,1] interval. In the
left figure, the short-term contract is available, unlike in the right figure.
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The short-term marriage contract prevails when the gains of marriage are large but temporary,  that is,
when the economy lies in the bottom-right corner (i.e.   is large and   is low). The long-term contract
prevails when the gains from marriage are large and persistent, that is, when the economy is in the upper-
right corner. Singleness prevails in the other cases.
The prevalence of the short-term contract depends on the cost of marriage   . To illustrate this claim,
Figure 3 shows the case where    is lower than before, and equals 0.05. Here, the short-term contract
would prevail for an even larger interval of values for household production parameters. The comparison
of the left and right figures illustrates that the introduction of short-term marriage contracts would not only
reduce  the  prevalence  of  long-term  contracts,  but,  also,  of  singleness,  depending  on  the  values  of
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household production parameters   and  .
Conclusions
Although the economics literature paid a large attention to various aspects of the marriage contract, the
issue of the optimal duration of the marriage has remained largely unexplored. In this paper, we developed
a simple two-period collective household model where agents make decisions about their marital status at
different points in time, and choose between long-term and short-term marriage contracts.
Our  conclusions  are  the  following.  First,  provided  the  household  production  technology  involves
decreasing returns from cooperation over time, the short-term contract dominates the long-run one under a
large  interval  of  values  for  preference  and  production  parameters.  Second,  the  overall  impact  of
introducing short-term contract  depends ultimately on what  currently drives  the marriage  decision.  If
agents marry by patience, then the long-term contract would still largely prevail despite the introduction of
a short contract. On the contrary, if individuals currently marry by impatience, then the short-term contract
would partly replace either the long-term marriage or singleness. Third, a more equal distribution of the
bargaining power within the household favors also the short-term marriage contract.
Finally, it may be worth to emphasize some limitations of the present work, which invite further research.
First, although one could interpret children as the produced good, it remains that the fertility decision may
affect the marriage decision in a more complex way than described in our model. In particular, children
could matter not only as consumption goods, but also as investment goods, or as an object of parental
altruism. Second, this model includes only one type of externalities (i.e. production externality within the
couple),  and leaves other externalities aside (e.g. jealousy of some couples, social norms). Third, this
model is purely deterministic. Obviously real-life marriage decisions involve risk, and this may affect the
desirability of the two kinds of marriage contracts. Hence much work remains to be done in the future.
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